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ABSTRACT 
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), alternatively the Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria (ISIS), is one of many non-state organizations that resulted from the 
extensive foreign intervention in the Middle East leading up to current conflicts there. 
Like the wider network that it used to be part of, ISIL is considered to be a great threat 
to modern first world countries. Using data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), 
this paper analyzed the relationship between the amount of territory ISIL held from June 
2014 to December 2015 and the attacks it carried out in that time, using Standard 
Deviational Ellipses to analyze directional orientation and distribution density of the 
attacks. The results showed that there was a slight correlation between significant land 
loss and increases in attacks in the following quarter. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 ISIL was founded in 1999 under the name Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (The 
Organization of Monotheism and Jihad) under the leadership of Jordanian Sunni radical, 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (Cheterian, 2015). Soon after, the group pledged themselves to 
the larger al-Qaeda terror network and took part in the fighting during the month-long 
Iraq War in 2003 and the 2011 Syrian Civil War, though they were only considered a 
serious threat in the latter conflict. Eleven years from their inception, a new leader, Abu 
Omar al-Baghdadi, changed the group’s name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant, and later the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, though the names tend to be used 
interchangeably. The leaders of al-Qaeda and various other members of the network 
cut ties completely with ISIL by February 2014 due to al-Baghdadi’s attempts to 
consolidate power under himself (Celso, 2015). During and following this dispute, ISIL 
carried out their Anbar Campaign, seizing control of Mosul and perpetrating the Sinjar 
Massacre. This offensive action sparked a renewal of US military operations in Iraq. 
 In June 2014, al-Baghdadi declared the beginning of a new caliphate, with 
himself as its Emir, and sought to turn ISIL’s territory into an actual state, which at the 
time consisted of holdings in northwest Iraq and northeast Syria (Celso, 2015). To be 
brief, ISIL’s state aspirations were rejected by world governments as well as moderate 
Muslims, both Sunni and Shi’ite. Since then, ISIL has been opposed by government 
forces of both Iraq and Syria and even other non-state militias such as the Kurds and al-
Qaeda (Celso, 2015). 
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Figure 1: Countries Attacked by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 2014-2015 
Created by Author on November 11, 2016. 
 
 Based on data drawn from the Global Terrorism Database (National Consortium 
for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016), ISIL carried out 2110 
attacks in 12 countries between June 2014 and December 2015, including Iraq, Syria, 
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, the Gaza Strip, Tunisia, Somalia, Egypt, 
Bahrain, and France (See Figure 1). However, Figure 1 only makes ISIL seem like it 
has a farther spatial reach than the organization actually possesses. Instead, the 
majority of these attacks took place in Iraq (See Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Division of Attacks by Country 
Created by Author on October 28, 2016. 
 
In total, these attacks resulted in 16,801 deaths and 11,408 injured (National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). While data 
on previous attacks by ISIL was available from the GTD, the dataset used covered the 
time after their official ties with al-Qaeda were severed. Figures 3 and 4 show the 
breakdown of the casualties by year and quarter. Despite the observed period during 
2014 being shorter by five months, the number of fatalities remained close to the same 
as the following year. Of the seven quarters observed, Quarters 2 and 3 2014 had the 
highest lethality and subsequent quarters were less lethal. 
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Figure 3: Casualties From ISIL Attacks World-Wide 2014-2015 
Created by Author on October 28, 2016. 
 
Figure 4: Casualties From ISIL Attacks By Quarter 2014-2015 
Created by Author on October 28, 2016. 
 During this time, ISIL has utilized a variety of methods of attack, though the most 
common has been bombing (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 2016). In 2014, 501 attacks were bombings, approximately 
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50% of all attacks (See Figure 5). In 2015, this number increased by nearly 50% to 771 
incidents (See Figure 5). The difference could be attributed to the length of the 
observed periods of each year, as 2014 was only observed for seven months. 
Interestingly, the increase in bombings appears to be inversely proportional to fatalities 
in 2015, save for a spike in Quarter 2 2015. The targets of these attacks have primarily 
been private citizens and property and military personnel (National Consortium for the 
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). In 2015, attacks on private 
citizens increased by close to 30% and attacks against military personnel nearly 
doubled (See Figure 6).  
 
Figure 5: Attack Types 2014-2015 
Created by Author on October 28, 2016. 
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Figure 6: Targets of Attack World-Wide 2014-2015 
Created by Author on October 28, 2016 
  By the end of June 2014, ISIL controlled (either psychologically or 
physically) territory in two countries as a result of the Anbar Campaign (See Figure 7). 
In Iraq, ISIL controlled or operated in most of the northern Tigris river area and a portion 
of the Euphrates, which included (but was not limited to) the cities of Mosul, Tall Afar, 
Tikrit, Abu Kamal, and Rawah, with additional small pockets to the north and to the west 
of Baghdad (See Figure 7). In Syria, ISIL held influence over most of the Euphrates 
River, which included (but is not limited to) the cities of Manbij, Bab, as-Safirah, at-
Tawrah, and ar-Raqqah (See Figure 7). 
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Figure 7: ISIS Actual Sanctuary Map: June 2014 
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on 
June 23, 2014]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-june-23-2014 
 This information prompts a line of questioning: (1) Is there a relationship between 
the amount of territory ISIL controls and the spatial spread of their activities? (2) Do 
changes in the size of ISIL’s territory affect the total number of attacks that they can 
carry out on a quarterly basis? 
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CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Studying Terrorism 
 The word “terrorism” is defined by the Merriam-Webster web dictionary as “the 
use of violent acts to frighten the people in an area as a way of trying to achieve a 
political goal” or “the systematic use of terror especially as a means of coercion” 
(Merriam-Webster, 2016). The word itself stems from the French word terrorisme, which 
referred to “state terrorism” practiced during the Jacobian “Reign of Terror” in the 1790s 
following the French Revolution. While terrorism is not a new tactic or subject of study, 
the study of terrorism did not gain prominence until the 1970s during the various 
conflicts in the Middle East and after the September 11, 2001 attack against the United 
States, which sparked the interest of academics in multiple fields and led to a surge in 
the publication of works on the subject (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2014). One of the issues with 
researching terrorism is defining what constitutes it, as there is no consensus on what 
defines terrorism (Roberts, 2015). Terrorism has come to be associated with guerrilla 
warfare carried out by non-state entities, such as al-Qaeda and ISIL, with the purpose of 
crippling morale by attacking civilian targets. However, operations carried out by 
government agencies can also be classified as terrorism, referred to as state terrorism. 
The infamous Nacht der langen Messer (Night of the Long Knives) is one such example 
that could be considered an act of state-sponsored terrorism. This paper only 
references non-state sponsored terrorism. 
 While incidents that qualify as terrorist attacks by the modern interpretation have 
occurred for centuries, perpetrated by individuals or small groups, there have not been 
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large organized non-state entities to study until the emergence of the al-Qaeda network. 
Different disciplines have different questions to ask and differing methods to gather 
answers to them. However, there is a common question: How effective is terrorism? 
The effectiveness of terror tactics is debatable. One argument poses that it is a rational 
tactic to encourage more such acts and to accomplish political goals. The opposing idea 
is that terror tactics are actually ineffective, as they cause the very people that the 
perpetrators are trying to convince to be hardened against their ideals because of their 
willingness to use acts such as suicide bombing. In between these two, there are 
scholars that say that the effectiveness of terror tactics is a case by case basis 
(Crenshaw 2014). The effectiveness debate is compounded due to the lack of 
agreement about what constitutes a terrorist attack (Sánchez-Cuenca 2014). What 
differentiates a terrorist bombing from a case of arson? Are attacks against civilian 
targets the only ones counted as terrorist attacks, or do military targets count as well 
(Plümper & Neumayer, 2010)?  
 Due to the relative scarcity of terrorism studies before the events of 9/11, a 
structure of study was not truly established. Early research into the subject attempted to 
use the same parameters used to study interstate wars, such as analyzing the 
connections between the warring states. However, this methodology did not apply well 
to the transnational nature of modern terrorist organizations (Young & Findley, 2011). 
Looking at the causes, the characteristics, and means of operations were similarly 
ineffective, so attention was turned towards how similar movements ended. Theories 
posited that typically, such movements either succeed at their goal, potentially 
becoming a legitimate political entity, or they are crushed by government action. In 
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reality, the latter has a high tendency to fail and backfire. What is far more likely is that 
the movement escalates their extremism and overreaches to the point where operation 
is no longer tenable and collapses from lack of support. The fact that has not happened 
to al-Qaeda in the 20 years of its existence led some to believe that they were unique in 
this regard (Crenshaw, 2014). 
 Research into terrorism can point out no singular cause for the phenomenon. 
Wealth is not a decisive reason, and only means that they can accomplish more. Al-
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden (1957-2011) was from a very wealthy Saudi Arabian 
family before becoming involved in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, and later 
channeled his family’s funds into the terrorist network. Other terrorists were poor and 
desperate, similar to the German people under the nascent Nazi regime during the late 
1930s. The majority of terrorists originate from financially poor areas (Erdem & 
Özdemir, 2009). Still others are fanatics, desiring to enforce their views on the rest of 
the world. The only common factor that could be attributed to terrorism is that on some 
level they are all displeased with some aspect of their society, whether something has 
or has not changed, and feel that the status quo cannot be altered without violence 
(Erdem & Özdemir, 2009).  
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
 Al-Qaeda, the “parent” organization of ISIL, was founded in 1988 in response to 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which was seen by extremists as an attack against 
Muslim culture. The invasion itself was one of the series of proxy wars between the 
Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War. Many of the members that 
would make up Al-Qaeda later on were part of Operation Cyclone, an endeavor on the 
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part of the Central Intelligence Agency to train and fund local forces to fight against the 
Soviets. The primary founder of Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Ladin, was a Saudi Arabian 
veteran of the conflict. Unlike ISIL, Al-Qaeda is not a centralized organization, but rather 
spread out into cells, allowing them to have a much farther reach than ISIL as well as 
being more difficult to root out. The organization had been in place and active in multiple 
countries for years before the 9/11 terror attacks (Cheterian, 2015). 
 Much of the current research on ISIL is based in political science and sociology, 
similarly to early research on al-Qaeda, examining their ideology and origins. 
Established in 1999 by Jordanian radical Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi, the organization was, 
at its inception, one of the more extreme jihadi groups that established themselves in 
northern Iraq. While he announced his allegiance to al-Qaeda in October 2004, al-
Zarqawi never put himself under their command, using the name to gather recruits from 
abroad (Cheterian, 2015. 110). Al-Zarqawi would be killed in an airstrike in 2006 and his 
organization, at the time named Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, would fall by the wayside 
despite his successor’s efforts. By 2009, ISIL was “dismissed as a dysfunctional and 
failed organization” until the Syrian Civil War in 2013 (Celso, 2015. 21). The war 
provided thousands of new recruits from both Syria and abroad, swelling ISIL’s ranks. 
The treatment of Sunni Muslims by Shi’ite political figures in Iraq also provided a larger 
pool of recruitment. This rapid buildup, combined with the withdrawal of United States 
forces from Iraq, enabled the Anbar campaign that resulted in ISIL’s capture of the 
northern provinces of Iraq in early 2014 (Celso, 2015). 
 ISIL’s stated intentions are very different from the network they once claimed 
allegiance to. Unlike al-Qaeda, ISIL showed interest in conquering and holding 
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territories early on. They attempt to enforce sharia law in the territory they rule, 
something which has continued to the present. While much of the world considers ISIL 
a non-state militia, they see themselves as a state power. Walt (2015) compares ISIL to 
revolutionary forces in past civil wars, citing examples such as the Bolsheviks or the 
Khmer Rouge. While ISIL certainly has religious origins and goals, scholars such as 
Brown (2015) and Gunter (2015) show that their actions are more geared towards the 
sectarian conflict in Iraq and Syria. Gunter (2015) focuses on the ongoing conflict 
between ISIL and the Kurds of Syria, Iraq, and Turkey and the political ramifications on 
the region. Brown (2015) compared ISIL’s actions to that of al-Qaeda, showing that 
despite ISIL’s stated intentions, they are either unable or unwilling to practice the same 
global-scale jihad that al-Qaeda carried out. Despite carrying out attacks in France and 
Belgium, most of ISIL’s activities have been in Iraq and Syria.  
 The conflicts against al-Qaeda, ISIL, and other non-state actors in the conflicts in 
the Middle East have required changes to international law due to their transnational 
nature (Schar, 2016). Before 9/11, most international laws only applied to state powers, 
which prevented the unlawful invasion of sovereign territories to combat non-state 
actors operating within their borders. These laws can be circumvented if the state in 
question has been proven to provide support to the non-state entity. The war against al-
Qaeda proved that such groups were willing to cross borders, requiring international law 
to be reinterpreted. The bombing campaigns against ISIL in 2014 were interpreted as 
“humanitarian interventions” by several countries to save more lives due to the Assad 
regime’s lack of action (Schar, 2016). 
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Plümper and Neumayer (2010) tested a hypothesis where they theorized that the 
stronger a country’s ally was militarily and economically, the more likely it was that they 
would be targeted by terrorist activities. They confirmed their hypothesis by concluding 
that the stronger the allied nation was and the higher the democracy level, the greater 
the risk of a terrorist attack directed against them. They also found that the risk 
increased for nations that were geographically closer. While the United States did not 
start out as allied with Iraq’s government, it can fulfill the first criteria in regards to the 
conflicts against al-Qaeda and ISIL. White, Porter, and Mazerolle (2013) used a similar, 
though expanded, methodology when they modeled terrorist activity in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand, looking for patterns between 2000 and 2010, though they did 
not study a particular group. They used three variables as the basis of this study: risk, 
resilience, and volatility. They concluded that Indonesia and the Philippines showed a 
steady decrease in risk from the peak at the beginning of the study period, despite a 
sudden spike in 2008 for the latter case. Thailand, on the other hand, had more 
fluctuations over the study period, despite having a lower baseline risk than the other 
two countries. While Indonesia and the Philippines had a greater risk, Thailand had 
greater volatility. The latter study potentially proves the conclusion of Gao, Guo, Liao, 
Webb, and Cutter (2013) that proximity to a nation that has already been attacked 
increases the chances of attacks in neighboring countries due to the relative closeness 
of the three nations observed, the Philippines and Indonesia in particular. This situation 
bears a resemblance to the one in the Middle East. Syria, Iraq, and Iran are 
geographically closer together, allowing terrorist groups to cross borders relatively 
easily. 
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Contributions of Geography 
 Geographical Information Systems have gained prominence in the field of 
terrorism study, allowing for efficient visualization and analysis of trends. Many 
researchers use GIS programs to analyze spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal trends, 
such as in the study of crime science and disease spread. Much in the same way that 
climate change can be predicted by documenting weather patterns, quantitative studies 
of terrorism watch for clusters of attacks over a set period of time, from which patterns 
can be found. Medina, Siebeneck, and Hepner (2011) utilized GIS to analyze spatio-
temporal patterns in terrorist attacks in Iraq. Using data collected from the U.S. National 
Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), they 
performed analyses for six month periods between 2004 and 2009. They concluded that 
there was a strong correlation between the number of attacks and the population count, 
and the number of attacks and population density, but no correlation between 
population or population density and attack intensity. The similarities between crime 
analysis and terrorism study are close enough that the same methods can be applied to 
both. Gao et al. (2013) utilized spatial auto-correlation, space-time clustering analyses, 
and hot spot detection to identify and analyze clusters. The coordinates of each terror 
incident were geocoded and analyzed by a space-time prospective analysis program 
called SaTScan to detect clusters and enable the researchers to focus on clusters with 
a high rate of terrorist activity. The researchers created “life trajectories” out of these 
clusters to display potential future patterns of growth for analysis. The results showed 
several patterns, one of which was a contagion effect based on proximity. The closer a 
country was to one that suffered an attack, the more likely it was to be attacked as well. 
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The mean is simply a single number that indicates a center in the data. With a 
map, the spatial mean is indicated by the mean x and y coordinates taken from the data 
and applied to a two-dimensional image. Standard Deviation is the measure of how 
many degrees of magnitude away from the center a given number in the data is. The 
first standard deviation away from the mean contains approximately 68.2% of all the 
scores, followed by 95.4% and 99.6% for the next two. In geography, the standard 
deviation circle is the same principle applied to a two-dimensional image to measure the 
spread of data. However, a standard deviation circle is only effective when the data is 
normally distributed. When the data is not normally distributed, a variant of the standard 
deviational circle is used: the Standard Deviational Ellipse (SDE). Coined by D. Welty 
Lefever in 1926 (Lefever, 1926), this measure of dispersion utilizes only the mean and 
standard deviation in its equations to first determine a center point, or mean center, 
upon which the ellipse would rotate, followed by calculating the curve to find the ellipse. 
The shape of the ellipse, according to Lefever, was “a function of the calculated 
standard deviation and the angle Ɵ between the two axes” (Lefever, 1926. 90). The 
orientation of the resulting ellipse was based off a line of best fit and concentration was 
measured by the ratio of points within the ellipse. The SDE has become an extremely 
versatile tool in GIS due to its ability to overcome issues associated with anisotrophic 
terrain by being able to detect potential relationships with a physical feature (Wang, B., 
2015). While standard deviational ellipses can be used on their own for analysis, they 
often serve as the base for higher level analyses (Wang, Shi, and Miao, 2015), such as 
determining directional orientation or distribution density of geographical units (Gong, 
2002). 
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The Standard Deviational Ellipse is based on three factors: the angle of rotation 
along the Cartesian coordinate system, the deviation along the major axis (x-axis), and 
the deviation along the minor axis (y-axis) (Wong and Lee, 2005). As such, it has not 
changed since Lefever coined the term, save for the calculations becoming more 
precise. Unlike the Standard Deviation Circle, the SDE can compensate for deviations 
in direction, indicated visually by the orientation of the ends of the major axis of the 
ellipse. Often, the distribution of points will also show linear patterns coinciding with 
geographical features or man-made structures, such as rivers or roads. The ellipse will 
become more circular if the data is closer to being normally distributed, and it becomes 
more elliptical if it is not normally distributed. Otherwise, an SDE operates on the same 
principles as a Standard Deviation Circle. 
Kent and Leitner would compare and contrast the use of standard deviation 
circles and standard deviational ellipses in the study of crime science (Kent and Leitner, 
2007). The standard deviation circle relied on a regularly distributed dispersion of points 
to provide an accurate assessment, but could not account for irregularly distributed data 
as the standard deviational ellipse could. In addition, the standard deviational ellipse 
was able to display directional data to more accurately analyze the patterns of 
commuting type crimes. Although published earlier, Levine would incorporate SDEs into 
the analytical methodology of his program, CrimeStat (Levine, 2006). CrimeStat 
operates by feeding crime data, namely locations and times of incidents, to produce 
visual and statistical data, one of the noted examples being standard deviational 
ellipses. Automated programs such as Crimestat are becoming necessary due to the 
sheer amount of data that needs to be processed on modern systems. 
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Other than crime analysis, standard deviational ellipses have seen prominence in 
tracking the spread of disease and immigration. Saxena et al. (2012) used various 
statistical methods to track the spread of malaria in India between 2007 and 2009. A 
weighted SDE was one of the methods used to display data from other analyses to note 
any changing trends and spatial shifting between the years of observation. Similar 
processes have been utilized by other malaria studies, such as Eryando, Susanna, 
Pratwi, and Nugraha (2012) during their observation in Indonesia, though they added in 
environmental factors such as rainfall and temperature. Tenzin, Dhand, Timsina, and 
Ward (2010) mapped out occurrences of rabies using SDEs to track the 2008 re-
emergence of rabies in Bhutan, concluding that the rapid spread was due to the 
contribution of stray dogs. Cui and Piracha (2012) utilized SDEs to show the distribution 
of both segregation and congregation of ethnicities in Sydney, Australia. They 
concluded that different ethnic groups of foreign born residents congregated to certain 
parts of Sydney due to factors such as socio-economic conditions and the size of the 
communities.  
This project will utilize Standard Deviational Ellipses, calculated and created with 
the Arcmap 10 software, to spatially analyze terror activities for a nineteen-month 
period. Data for the analysis was retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database created 
by the University of Maryland, starting in June 2014 and ending in December 2015. 
ArcMap 10 will also be used to geocode the data to enable the creation of spatial 
means and Standard Deviational Ellipses for each quarter observed. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
Source Data 
 The dataset used for this project was pulled from the Global Terrorism Database 
(GTD) and contains 2,008 data points. The Global Terrorism Database is a database 
maintained by the University of Maryland. Data is collected from open-source media by 
the faculty of the University of Maryland, though it is not added to the database until it 
has been confirmed to be credible. Inherited from the Pinkerton Global Intelligence 
Service in 2001, the database contains data on terrorist attacks from 1970 to 2015, a 
total of approximately 150,000 attacks with over 45 variables. The database is noted as 
the “most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist events in the world” 
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016).  
The parameters used to select the data were that the incidents occurred after 
June 2014 and that the perpetrator group was ISIL. The data was intended to coincide 
with ISIL’s declaration of independence from al-Qaeda. The data consists of the name 
of the city and country of occurrence, casualties, weapon type, target type, and date 
(See Table 1). No incidents following December 2015 have been added to the GTD as 
of the writing of this paper (May 2017). The data retrieved was only for attacks 
confirmed to have been carried out by ISIS and its affiliate organizations, excluding 
merely “ISIS-inspired” attacks. 
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Quarter Number of Attacks Fatalities Injured 
Quarter 2 2014 (June) 119 2959 695 
Quarter 3 2014 (July-September) 423 3232 1890 
Quarter 4 2014 (October-December) 338 2173 1377 
Quarter 1 2015 (January-March) 288 1712 1300 
Quarter 2 2015 (April-June) 338 2866 1846 
Quarter 3 2015 (July-September) 322 2086 2171 
Quarter 4 2015 (October-December) 280 1773 2128 
Table 1: Summarization of numerical data retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database 
Pre-processing 
 Before analysis could begin, one issue needed to be resolved. The dataset from 
the GTD was not geocoded and so had to have latitude and longitude values added 
manually. The latitude and longitude values were entered into an Excel spreadsheet 
and were used to create a cities shapefile in ArcMap 10, upon which spatial analysis 
could be based. Due to the need to examine the data over time, the dataset was split up 
into different groups based on the date of the incident. This resulted in seven new 
datasets, each representing three month periods. The exception was the first group, 
representing only June 2014, which was used as a baseline to compare with 
subsequent quarters. Following this, the spreadsheets containing the data from the 
GTD were entered into spatial joins with the “cities” shapefile based on the city name to 
create the basis of analysis.  
 The maps used for the later analysis use two different projections due to the 
spread of ISIL’s activities from the Middle East. Maps centered on the Middle East are 
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projected using the UTM WGS 1984 38N (See Figures 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 21, 22, and 
23). The maps showing more of the world are projected with the Robinson World 
projection (See Figures 1 and 20). 
Spatial Data 
 Changes in spatial patterns over time were analyzed with the creation of seven 
maps, one for each quarter of the year between June 2014 and December 2015. As 
ISIL’s attacks began to occur in more countries, the area of observation increased as 
well. The attacked cities were displayed with graduated symbols with the larger symbols 
representing more attacks in the city indicated.  
A spatial mean was created for each map in ArcMap 10, weighted by the number 
of attacks per city, resulting in it being placed within one standard deviation of 
approximately 68% of all points on the map, though this number varied from map to 
map. From there, a weighted Standard Deviational Ellipse was applied to each map to 
highlight spatial shifts in both the clustering of attacks and the spatial mean, utilizing the 
same parameters. Based on the number of cities and their distribution, the ellipse would 
either shrink or grow. The spatial mean and the Standard Deviational Ellipse are used to 
express the statistical mean and standard deviation in a visual format for data that is not 
normally distributed by averaging the geographical positions of each point against the 
spatial mean, using weighting factors to determine importance based on the number of 
attacks per city. The ellipse can also indicate physical features of the landscape based 
on the orientation. For example, the ellipse for Quarter 2 2014 is northwest to southeast 
oriented and nearly matches the direction of the Tigris River, around which most of the 
attacks for that quarter have taken place. 
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The Standard Deviational Ellipse also shows the distribution of points by the 
shape of the ellipse. The closer to being normally distributed the data is, the more 
circular the ellipse becomes. If the points are not normally distributed, the ellipse 
narrows and lengthens to accommodate the furthest point. In Quarter 4 2015, the Paris 
attacks, an extreme outlier, cause the ellipse for that quarter to stretch well beyond the 
area the other ellipses cover. Excluding the extreme outlier causes the resulting ellipse 
to show the data as being closer to normally distributed. 
Spatial Analysis and Results 
 The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) is an American think tank founded in 
2007 by Dr. Kimberly Kagen as an open source, non-partisan, and non-profit research 
organization (Institute for the Study of War, 2007). One of the on-going projects is a 
series of maps created by members of the ISW using non-classified and fully 
documented information, as well as staff in the field, showing the progression of ISIL’s 
territory gains and losses.  
 On these maps, the colors represent different aspects of analysis. Black 
represents territory that ISIL controlled either physically or psychologically. Red 
represents territory known to be frequently attacked, but is not controlled by ISIL. Brown 
represents regions where ISIL support can be found, but the territory is not controlled by 
ISIL. Green represents land controlled by the Kurds. The blue ellipses present on 
several of the maps are not Standard Deviational Ellipses, but indicators of changes to 
any of the above categories. 
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 Beginning in June 2014, ISIL controlled (either psychologically or physically) 
territory in two countries (See Figure 7) as a result of the Anbar Campaign (Celso, 
2015). In Iraq, they controlled most of the northern Tigris river area and a portion of the 
Euphrates, which included (but is not limited to) the cities of Mosul, Tall Afar, Tikrit, Abu 
Kamal, and Rawah, with additional small pockets to the north and to the west of 
Baghdad. In Syria, they held influence over most of the Euphrates River, which included 
(but is not limited to) the cities of Manbij, Bab, as-Safirah, at-Tawrah, and ar-Raqqah. 
 By the end of Quarter 2 2014, ISIL carried out a total of 119 attacks that resulted 
in 2959 deaths and 695 injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 2016). The majority of these attacks took place in Iraq 
between Mosul and Baghdad, which are displayed with graduated symbols (See Figure 
8). The mean center of the attacks was determined to be just west of Tikrit, Iraq, in 
between the two largest concentrations of attacks: Mosul and Aythah (See Figure 8). 
The standard deviational ellipse covers approximately 350 miles on the x-axis and 250 
miles on the y-axis. Of the 41 cities attacked during this time, 28 (70%) were within one 
standard deviational ellipse of the mean center (See Figure 8). The ellipse had a 
directional orientation of northwest to southeast at approximately 80 degrees clockwise, 
to encompass Mosul and Aythah. Due to Quarter 2 2014 encompassing a single month 
instead of three, it was only used as a baseline and comparisons of activity between 
2014 and 2015 excluded it as an outlier. 
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Figure 8: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 2 2014 Attacks 
Created by Author on October 31, 2016. 
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Figure 9: ISIS Sanctuary Map: September 10, 2014 
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on 
September 10, 2014]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-september-10-2014 
By September 2014, ISIL had lost control of the road south of Tuz Khurmatu, Iraq 
(See Figure 9). Otherwise, they had not gained or lost significant amounts of territory. 
The section of northern Iraq denoted by light green represents areas inhabited by the 
Kurds, whose armed forces are considered another non-state militia, though one in 
opposition of ISIL. 
During Quarter 3 2014, ISIL carried out 423 attacks, causing 3232 deaths and 
1890 injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, 2016). As before, these attacks primarily took place in Iraq, close to the 
center of their control. The standard deviational ellipse covers approximately 500 miles 
25 
 
on the x-axis and 300 miles on the y-axis. Of the 94 cities attacked, 63 (67%) were 
within one standard deviational ellipse of the mean center, determined to be just west of 
Tikrit. While the mean center was only shifted a few miles southwest, the ellipse was 
west to east oriented at approximately 20 degrees clockwise due to several attacks in 
Turkey and Egypt (See Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 3 2014 Attacks 
Created by Author on October 31, 2016. 
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Figure 11: ISIS Sanctuary Map: December 5, 2014 
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on 
December 5, 2014]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-december-5-2014 
In winter 2014, ISIL’s control territory grew to include Aleppo and the northern 
Syrian border, as well as Hit, Iraq (See Figure 11). ISIL lost control of Baiji, but 
continued attacks in the area. 
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Figure 12: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 4 2014 Attacks 
Created by Author on October 31, 2016. 
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Over the course of 338 attacks in Quarter 4 2014, there were 2173 deaths and 
1377 injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, 2016). The standard deviational ellipse covered approximately 350 miles on 
the x-axis and 150 miles on the y-axis. Of the 75 cities attacked, 50 (67%) were within 
one standard deviational ellipse of the mean center. The mean center shifted 
approximately fifty miles southwest of Tikrit, Iraq. The resulting ellipse was northwest to 
southwest oriented at approximately 45 degrees clockwise (See Figure 12), due to a 
lack of activity in Egypt and an increase in activity on the Syria-Turkey border, 
specifically in Kobani, Syria. 
 
Figure 13: ISIS Sanctuary Map: March 4, 2015 
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on 
March 4, 2015]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-march-4-2015 
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Between January and March 2015, ISIL gained territory on the Syria-Lebanon 
border, though they also lost approximately one-third of their control of the Turkey-Syria 
border (See Figure 13). 
 During Quarter 1 2015, ISIL carried out 288 attacks, causing 1712 deaths and 
1846 injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 
Terrorism, 2016). The standard deviational ellipse covered approximately 400 miles on 
the x-axis and 300 miles on the y-axis. The mean center of the SDE rests approximately 
100 miles southwest of Tikrit, a difference of 50 miles from Quarter 4 2014. Of the 86 
cities attacked, 53 (61%) were within one standard deviational ellipse of the mean 
center. The resulting ellipse is northwest to southeast oriented at approximately 45 
degrees clockwise (See Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 1 2015 Attacks 
Created by Author on October 31, 2016. 
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Figure 15: ISIS Sanctuary Map: June 19, 2015 
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on 
June 19, 2015]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.understandingwar.org/map/isis-sanctuary-june-19-2015 
 One year after their declaration, ISIL lost control of most of the north Syrian 
border remaining after Quarter 1 2015 (See Figure 15). They also made the largest gain 
in territory during this time by seizing a significant amount of territory between 
Damascus and Deir ez Zeur in Syria as well as south of Damascus. 
Over 338 attacks in Quarter 2 2015, ISIL caused 2866 deaths and 1846 injured 
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). 
The standard deviational ellipse covered approximately 500 miles on the x-axis and 250 
miles on the y-axis. The mean center is approximately 75 miles west of Tikrit. Of the 90 
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cities attacked, only 48 (53%) were within one standard deviational ellipse from the 
mean center. The SDE is northwest to southeast oriented at approximately 45 degrees 
clockwise (See Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 2 2015 Attacks 
Created by Author on October 31, 2016. 
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Figure 17: ISIS Sanctuary Map: September 15, 2015 
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on 
September 15, 2015]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.understandingwar.org/map/isis-sanctuary-map-september-15-2015 
 By September 2015, ISIL seized the road between ar-Rutbah, Iraq, and the Iraq-
Syria border (See Figure 17). They also secured and expanded their hold on the road 
between Mosul and Hawija. 
ISIL carried out 323 attacks in Quarter 3 2015, in which 2086 people were killed 
and 2171 were injured (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism, 2016). The standard deviational ellipse covered approximately 450 miles 
on the x-axis and 250 miles on the y-axis. The mean center was 100 miles west of 
Tikrit. Of the 77 cities attacked, 47 (61%) were within one standard deviational ellipse of 
35 
 
the mean center. The ellipse was northwest to southwest oriented at 45 degrees 
clockwise (See Figure 18). 
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Figure 18: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 3 2015 Attacks 
Created by Author on October 31, 2016. 
 
37 
 
 
Figure 19: ISIS Sanctuary Map: December 21, 2015 
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on 
December 21, 2015]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.understandingwar.org/map/isis-sanctuary-december-21-2015 
 By December 2015, ISIL lost control of Sinjar and the surrounding region while 
making no significant gains (See Figure 19). During Quarter 4 2015, ISIL performed 280 
attacks, killing 1773 people and injuring 2128 (National Consortium for the Study of 
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). For the first time, ISIL struck outside of 
the Middle East with attacks in France and Tunisia. The resulting standard deviational 
ellipse covered 1350 miles on the x-axis and 225 miles on the y-axis. The mean center 
was 170 miles west of Tikrit. Of the 74 cities attacked, 53 (71%) were within one 
standard deviational ellipse of the mean center. The standard deviational ellipse was 
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northwest to southeast oriented at 30 degrees clockwise (See Figure 20). The extreme 
difference between the Quarter 3 2015 SDE and the Quarter 4 2015 SDE can be 
attributed to the presence of several extreme outliers: the Paris and Tunis City attacks. 
Excluding the extreme outliers resulted in a more normally-shaped ellipse that covered 
500 miles on the x-axis and 250 miles on the y-axis. The mean center was estimated to 
be 50 miles southwest of Tikrit. The ellipse contained only 39 (54%) of the 72 cities 
attacked during that quarter (See Figure 21). 
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Figure 20: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 4 2015 Attacks 
Created by Author on October 31, 2016. 
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Figure 21: Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Quarter 4 2015 Attacks Excluding Extreme Outliers 
Created by Author on November 30, 2016. 
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 Overall, the mean center of attacks from 2014 to 2015 has shifted approximately 
125 miles west (See Figure 22). However, the exclusion of the extreme outliers in 
France and Tunisia caused the mean center of Quarter 4 2015 to shift southeast of its 
original position, resulting in a net shift of 35 miles southwest from 2014 to 2015 (See 
Figure 23). The Standard Deviational Ellipses shifted from north to south oriented to 
west to east oriented. The Quarter 2 2014 ellipse (See Figure 8) matched the Tigris 
River due to most of ISIL’s attacks during that period occurring in cities on the banks of 
the river. The ellipses of subsequent quarters were oriented to match the Euphrates 
River due to both an increase in activity in cities along the river and countries to the 
south and west of Iraq and Syria. 
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Figure 22: Standard Deviational Ellipses and Mean Centers 2014-2015 
Created by Author on November 28, 2016. 
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Figure 23: Standard Deviational Ellipses and Mean Centers 2014-2015 With Exclusion of Outliers 
Created by Author on December 5, 2016. 
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Figure 6 : June 2014    Figure 7: September 2014 
               
Figure 8 : December 2014   Figure 9: March 2015 
             
Figure 10: June 2015    Figure 11: September 2015 
 
Figure 13: December 2015 
Figure 24: ISIL Territory Change Overview 
Compiled by Author on April 26, 2017. 
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Figure 13: Quarter 2 2014 Figure 14: Quarter 3 2014 Figure 15: Quarter 4 2014 
             
Figure 16: Quarter 1 2015 Figure 17: Quarter 2 2015  Figure 18: Quarter 3 2015 
 
Figure 20: Quarter 4 2015  
Figure 25: ISIL Attack Overview 
Compiled by Author on April 26, 2017. 
 Looking at the overviews of both the territory changes (See Figure 24) and the 
attacks carried out by ISIL (See Figure 25) shows that, though ISIL gradually shifted its 
power base into Syria, the majority of their activities continued to take place in Iraq. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 The largest land gain (See Figure 13) and second highest number of attacks 
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016) 
were during Quarter 2 2015 when ISIL seized territory to the northeast and southeast of 
Damascus, Syria. The territorial losses of the previous quarter, which included a 
significant amount of the Syria-Turkey border and was the largest loss of the seven 
quarters (See Figure 11), seem to correlate with the increase in attacks that occurred 
during Quarter 2 2015 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism, 2016).  However, Quarter 3 2014, which saw little to no territorial gains 
(See Figure 9), had the highest number of attacks and the most damage caused 
(National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). 
The increase could be attributed to fervor generated by al-Baghdadi’s announcement in 
June 2014, with the intent of the attacks being on causing damage rather than seizing 
land. 
 The mean center for each map shifted west as more attacks occurred outside of 
Iraq and Syria, though due to the concentration of attacks on cities near the Tigris River, 
it did not move very far (See Figure 25). The points were relatively normally distributed, 
though the Standard Deviational ellipses grew on the x-axis and y-axis to accommodate 
more points. The exception to this is Quarter 4 2015 (See Figure 20), where ISIL made 
its first attacks outside of the Middle East. 
 With the exclusion of Quarter 2 2014 and the extreme outliers from Quarter 4 
2015, the majority of the data show very little geographical changes (See Figure 23). 
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Despite increasing numbers of attacks by ISIL-inspired perpetrators, the majority of ISIL 
attacks remain in Iraq and Syria (See Figure 24 and 25). While the directional 
orientation of the Standard Deviational Ellipses may change, the sizes of the SDEs 
remain close (See Table 2). 
Quarter X-Axis 
(In Miles) 
Y-Axis 
(In Miles) 
Quarter 2 2014 350 250 
Quarter 3 2014 500 300 
Quarter 4 2014 350 150 
Quarter 1 2015 400 300 
Quarter 2 2015 500 250 
Quarter 3 2015 450 250 
Quarter 4 2015* 500 250 
Asterisk Indicates Exclusion of Outliers  
Table 2: Approximate Dimensions of SDEs per Quarter (In Miles) 
 
 While the data from the Global Terrorism Database ends at December 2015 as 
of the writing of this paper (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism, 2016), ISIL has continued to spread its influence. Media 
sources report more attacks outside of the Middle East, such as the attack in Brussels, 
Belgium on March 22, 2016. There have also been reports of attacks in east Asia, such 
as Indonesia and the Phillipines (Lister et al., 2016). While many of the attacks reported 
are actually committed by ISIL, attacks committed by “ISIS-inspired” terrorists are 
reported with them. ISIL’s controlled territory has almost completely shifted into Syria. 
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Figure 26: ISIS Sanctuary Map: December 8, 2016 
Data Source: Institute for the Study of War. (2007). [Map Illustration of ISIS territory on December 
8, 2016]. ISW Map Room: ISIS. Retrieved from 
http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/isis-sanctuary-map-december-8-2016 
 Despite ISIL’s now seemingly longer reach, their territory inside of the Middle 
East has been reduced significantly since December 2015 (See Figure 13). As of 
December 2016 (See Figure 26), the only pieces of territory ISIL controls inside of Iraq 
are Mosul, Hawaji, and Qaim, with their power base having almost completely shifted 
into Syria. These pieces of information suggest a correlation between loss of territory 
and potential range of operation. A concern has come up over the current fighting over 
Mosul: If Mosul is lost, will surviving ISIL operatives begin striking out at Europe (Meyer 
& Nichols, 2016) as foreign fighters return home? This concern is also applicable to the 
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territories in Syria, as once their centralized power is gone where will the fighters go? 
Based on the data used for this paper and subsequent developments in 2016, ISIL is 
not quite the global threat that many fear it to be. While certainly dangerous, their 
activities have been limited in scope and decreasingly effective, at least in regards to 
their stated goal. 
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